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rst-order approach is not innocuous. For example, in
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1 Introduction
The economic analysis of rank-order tournaments presents itself today as a
tremendously successful research area that has experienced a steady increase
in interest since its very beginnings.1 On the theoretical front, it has of-
ten been crucial to characterize the optimal tournament (Lazear and Rosen,
1981; Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz, 1983; Akerlof and Holden, 2012). This task has
most commonly been accomplished using the so-called rst-order approach,
i.e., by replacing a continuum of incentive compatibility conditions in the
rms design problem with a single marginal condition. However, the rst-
order approach is not generally valid, and as a consequence, the properties
of the optimal tournament have sometimes been discussed under somewhat
restrictive or even indistinct conditions.2
In this paper, an alternative route to the analysis of optimal rank-order
tournaments is taken. The approach entails the construction of an upper
envelopeover all incentive compatibility conditions, which is then added as
an inequality constraint to the relaxed problem. Thereby, the optimal tour-
nament may be characterized as the solution of an optimization problem with
a nite number of constraints. Of course, the thereby reformulated problem
remains di¢ cult. However, in contrast to the original problem, techniques
from Milgrom and Segal (2002) may be applied to derive key properties of
the optimal tournament even if the rst-order approach is invalid or di¢ cult
to justify.
1See, e.g., the evidence provided by Connelly et al. (2014). For an introduction to the
economics of tournaments, see Mookherjee (1990) or Prendergast (1999, Sec. 2.3).
2Useful discussions of the scope and limitations of the rst-order approach in tourna-
ment theory can be found in McLaughlin (1988) and Gürtler (2011).
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The main result of this paper is that the rst-order approach to tour-
nament design is not innocuous. Specically, it is found that traditional
conclusions regarding the e¢ ciency of rank-order tournaments are not uni-
versally valid and sometimes too optimistic. In fact, tournaments may be
substantially less e¢ cient than suggested by the existing literature.3 Fur-
ther, with additional structure imposed on the cost and utility functions,
the optimal tournament may be characterized in explicit terms even if the
rst-order approach is invalid. The paper also considers an extension to tour-
naments with many contestants and a single winner, which may be seen as
an equilibrium analysis complementing prior work.
The observation that the rst-order approach is not generally valid in
a moral hazard setting is due to Mirrlees (1975). Subsequent research on
the rst-order approach may be roughly divided into two strands. A rst
strand of literature is concerned with formulating su¢ cient conditions for
the rst-order approach (Rogerson, 1985; Jewitt, 1988; Sinclair-Desgagné,
1994; Conlon, 2009; Ke, 2013; Kirkegaard 2014a). A second strand of lit-
erature has aimed at eliminating restrictive assumptions from the standard
model of moral hazard (Grossman and Hart, 1983; Mirrlees, 1986; Araujo
and Moreira, 2001; Ke, 2012; Kadan and Swinkels, 2013; Kirkegaard 2014b;
Renner and Schmedders, 2015). The present paper di¤erentiates itself from
these contributions already by its focus on rank-order tournaments. How-
ever, also the approach is di¤erent. For example, the present paper does
not employ a Lagrangian function. Some implications of this point will be
3The present paper deals exclusively with the incentive side of rank-order tournaments.
The selection e¢ ciency of tournaments has been studied by Clark and Riis (2001), Hvide
and Kristiansen (2003), and Münster (2007), for instance.
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discussed in the conclusion.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces
the set-up, and discusses existence. The envelope approach is developed
in Section 3. A characterization of the optimal tournament is presented in
Section 4, and discussed in Section 5. An extension with more than two
contestants is o¤ered in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. All proofs have been
relegated to an Appendix.
2 Set-up and existence
Consider a market environment in which risk-neutral rms hire workers to
produce output of per-unit value V > 0. Given a wage W and an e¤ort
level   0, a workers utility is dened as U(W )   C(), where U is twice
di¤erentiable with U 0 > 0, U 00  0, and C is four times di¤erentiable with
C 0  0, C 00 > 0, C 0(0) = 0, and C 0() ! 1 as  ! 1.4 Worker js
output (j = 1; 2) is the sum of his e¤ort j and a random component "j,
i.e., qj = j + "j. It will be assumed that the distribution function G of the
di¤erential error term   "2   "1 is symmetric with respect to the origin
and allows a twice di¤erentiable density g = G0 > 0 such that g0 and g00 are
bounded. Given a pair of prizes (W1;W2) withW1  W2, worker js expected
4The additively separable form of the utility function ensures tractability (cf. Green
and Stokey, 1983; Krishna and Morgan, 1998; Akerlof and Holden, 2012). As discussed
in McLaughlin (1988), alternative specications of the workers utility function tend to
produce similar conclusions under the rst-order approach. It is conjectured that the
same is true for the additional settings considered in the present paper.
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utility from playing j against k, with k 6= j, is then given as
U(W1)prob[qj > qk] + U(W2)(1  prob[qj > qk])  C(j) (1)
= U(W2) + (U(W1)  U(W2))G(j   k)  C(j).
In the usual dual formulation, rms choose prizes and an e¤ort level so as
to maximize a workers expected utility subject to zero-prot and incentive
compatibility conditions:
max
W1W2
0
U(W1) + U(W2)
2
  C() (2)
s.t.
V =
W1 +W2
2
(3)
(U(W1)  U(W2))G(b  )  C(b) (4)
 (U(W1)  U(W2))G(0)  C() (b  0)
Problem (2-4) will be called the unrelaxed problem. A solution (W 1 ;W

2 ; 
)
to the unrelaxed problem will be referred to (somewhat loosely) as an optimal
tournament associated with G.
Under the rst-order approach (FOA), the continuum of incentive com-
patibility conditions in (4) is replaced by the single marginal condition
g(0)(U(W1)  U(W2)) = C 0(): (5)
Condition (5) is necessary for any solution of the unrelaxed problem.5 We
will refer to the maximization problem (2), subject to constraints (3) and
(5), as the relaxed problem.
5This is obvious if the optimum e¤ort choice is interior, i.e., if  > 0. If, however,
 = 0, then the Inada conditions imposed on the cost function imply that W 1 =W

2 , so
that (5) is satised also in that case.
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The relaxed problem is known to allow a solution (W FOA1 ;W
FOA
2 ; 
FOA)
that can be approximated by replacing utility and cost functions with their
respective second-order Taylor expansions. For example, the e¤ort level and
the prize spread may be approximated by
C 0(FOA)  V
1 + sC 00=4g(0)2
(6)
and
W FOA1  W FOA2 
g(0)V
g(0)2 + sC 00=4
, (7)
respectively, where s =  U 00=U 0 denotes the workers Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient
of absolute risk aversion, and marginal utility is normalized to unity at mean
income.6 Moreover, if the workers expected utility function
UFOA() = U(W FOA2 ) +G(  FOA)(U(W FOA1 )  U(W FOA2 ))  C() (8)
is, say, strictly concave, then (W FOA1 ;W
FOA
2 ; 
FOA) solves also the unrelaxed
program. In particular, in the risk-neutral case, C 0(FOA) = V , and the
resulting allocation of resources is e¢ cient.
When UFOA is not strictly concave, however, then there is no guarantee
that all the incentive compatibility conditions in (4) hold, i.e., the e¤ort
level FOA may be merely a local maximum of UFOA.7 In other words, FOA
need not be a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the tournament
with prizes (W FOA1 ;W
FOA
2 ). In that case, (W
FOA
1 ;W
FOA
2 ; 
FOA) will not be
6The specic expressions in (6) and (7) are taken from McLaughlin (1988, p. 231).
These expressions are most accurate when g(0) is large, so that the second-order Taylor
approximations are accurate, and when s is small, so that the normalization of marginal
utility matters least. When these conditions are not satised, however, it is preferable to
solve the relaxed problem numerically, as done below.
7Indeed, FOA may fail to be a global maximum of UFOA even if the second-order
condition holds strictly at FOA (as it does under the present assumptions), and even if a
deviation to a zero e¤ort level is unprotable for the worker.
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a solution of the unrelaxed problem, which illustrates the limits of the rst-
order approach. In the present paper, a somewhat generous stance will be
taken by calling the rst-order approach invalid only if, for every solution of
the relaxed problem, there is at least one incentive compatibility condition
in (4) that fails to hold true.8
As pointed out by Green and Stokey (1983), the potential non-existence of
a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a tournament with arbitrary
prizes does not impair the rms ability to design the contract (W1;W2; )
in such a way that  is a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the
tournament with prizes (W1;W2).9 In fact, as shown in the Appendix, this
design problem can always be solved in an optimal way.
Proposition 1. An optimal tournament exists (i.e., even if the rst-order
approach is invalid).
The proposition raises the question of how the optimal tournament looks
like in settings not traditionally considered. This question is addressed in
the following sections.10
8Thus, the rst-order approach is valid in the terminology of the present paper if some
solution (W FOA1 ;W
FOA
2 ; 
FOA) of the relaxed problem satises all the incentive compati-
bility conditions in (4). It will be noted that the denition for validity used in the present
paper is slightly less demanding than the one employed by Rogerson (1985, p. 1363), who
required for validity that any solution of the relaxed problem should satisfy incentive com-
patibility. However, the two denitions coincide when the relaxed problem has a unique
solution, such as in the risk-neutral case or in the cases considered in Sections 4 and 5.
9See Green and Stokey (1983, fn. 3): For arbitrary prize structures, there may be no
Nash equilibrium, symmetric or otherwise. This is of no importance to us, since we are
considering only tournaments that are designed so that they do have a symmetric Nash
equilibrium (emphasis in the original).
10The restriction to tournaments that allow a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
is denitely a choice we made. Alternatively, one could have assumed that rms may
choose to implement mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, the literature o¤ers
little guidance with regard to this point. For example, while Green and Stokey (1983)
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3 Side-stepping the rst-order approach
This section describes the envelope approach to rank-order tournaments that
has been outlined in the Introduction. Note rst that one may add the
equality constraint
U(W1)  U(W2) = ()  C
0()
g(0)
(9)
to the unrelaxed problem (2-4) without a¤ecting the solution. Provided that
(9) holds, however, incentive compatibility (4) becomes equivalent to
()(G(b  ) G(0)) + C()  C(b)  0 (b  0). (10)
Consider now the upper envelopeof the individual constraints in (10), i.e.,
'() = maxb0 f(G(b  ) G(0))() + C()  C(b)g , (11)
where the maximum is attained as a consequence of the Inada conditions.
The unrelaxed problem (2-4) may then be reformulated as
max
0
U() (12)
s.t. '()  0, (13)
where U() denotes the value of the rms objective function (2) under the
condition that the prize structure (W1;W2) is dened implicitly through (3)
and (5).11 The reformulated problem (12-13) is still not standard, because '
consider only pure-strategy equilibria, Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983) nd it more natural to
allow for randomization. This point will be taken up again in the conclusion.
11It is not hard to check that U() is well-dened for any   0. Indeed, using (3) to
eliminate W2 in (5), one obtains
U(W1)  U(2V  W1) = C
0()
g(0)
.
Di¤erentiating the left-hand side with respect to W1, and noting that U 0 > 0, shows that
there is at most one solution. Further, since U 00  0, the left-hand side approaches 1
as W1 ! 1. By continuity, there is a unique solution.
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may have kinks. However, using the tools provided by Milgrom and Segal
(2002), it can be shown that ' is monotone increasing if marginal costs
are logconcave.12 Moreover, since '(0) = 0, monotonicity implies that the
feasible set in the reformulated problem (12-13) is a closed interval whose
left endpoint is zero. Hence, the following result is obtained.
Proposition 2. Assume that C 0 is logconcave, and that the rst-order ap-
proach is invalid. Then  < FOA for any pair of respective solutions of the
unrelaxed and the relaxed problems.
Proposition 2 shows that the rst-order approach to tournament design is
not innocuous, in the sense that it has the potential to cause a bias in the
level of e¤ort considered to be implementable.
For intuition, suppose that (W FOA1 ;W
FOA
2 ; 
FOA) is a solution of the re-
laxed problem, yet that the rst-order approach is invalid. Then, FOA is
not a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the tournament dened
through prizes (W FOA1 ;W
FOA
2 ).
13 In other words, there necessarily exists
an e¤ort level FOA 6= FOA such that UFOA(FOA) > UFOA(FOA), where
UFOA is dened through equation (8) above.14 Without loss of generality,
FOA may be chosen to be a global optimum of UFOA, so that '(FOA) =
UFOA(FOA)   UFOA(FOA) > 0. But if ' is monotone increasing, then the
12Being a rather mild assumption, logconcavity of marginal costs has been imposed in
prior work (e.g., Chan et al., 2009; Akerlof and Holden, 2012), and is consistent with both
convex and concave marginal costs. Also, marginal costs cannot be globally logconvex
under the Inada conditions imposed. Still, it remains an assumption, of course.
13Indeed, if FOA were a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the tournament
with prizes (W FOA1 ;W
FOA
2 ), then (W
FOA
1 ;W
FOA
2 ; 
FOA) would satisfy incentive compat-
ibility, and hence, would solve the unrelaxed problem, in conict with our presumption
that the rst-order approach is invalid.
14Moreover, provided that g is unimodal, FOA < FOA , as intuition suggests.
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rms only way to reduce the workers incentive to deviate is it to lower the
contractual level of e¤ort relative to FOA.
To understand why an assumption on costs is needed, note that raising
 has altogether three e¤ects on the envelope constraint (13). First, C()
increases, which tightens the constraint. Second, U(W1)  U(W2) increases,
which loosens the constraint. Finally, deviations become less likely to win,
which also loosens (13). However, if costs are not excessively convex then
the change to the prize structure remains su¢ ciently moderate compared
to the di¤erential of the other two e¤ects, tipping the balance in favor of a
tightening constraint.
The size of the potential welfare loss captured by Proposition 2 is not
negligible. To the contrary, as will become clear below, tournaments may be
quite ine¤ective as an incentive device.15
4 An explicit characterization
This section presents a complete characterization of the optimal tournament
in a standard setting. Specically, it will be assumed that costs are quadratic,
i.e., that C() = c2=2 for some c > 0, and that workers exhibit a con-
stant absolute risk aversion, i.e., that either U(W ) =  e sW=s for s > 0 or
U(W ) =W . These assumptions are made for tractability and can be relaxed.
Indeed, as discussed below, the main features of the optimal tournament do
not depend on these assumptions.
To describe the equilibrium in cases where the rst-order approach is not
15To mitigate the welfare loss, rms might decide to use deliberately inaccurate perfor-
mance measures (OKee¤e et al., 1984), or to induce mixed-strategy equilibria (Nalebu¤
and Stiglitz, 1983, Appendix). Both options are excluded here, however.
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valid, it proves useful to take a comparative statics perspective with respect
to the dispersion of the di¤erential error term. Thus, for a given distribution
function G and an arbitrary parameter  > 0, one denes a new distribution
function G(z)  G(z=), where a larger  corresponds to a more dispersed
distribution of the di¤erential error term. E.g., if G is standard normal, then
G is normal with mean zero and standard deviation .
It is shown in the Appendix (see Lemma A.2) that, under the present as-
sumptions, the rms indirect objective function U  U is strongly pseudo-
concave in , i.e., that the strict second-order condition for a local maximum
holds at any critical point. In particular, there is a unique optimal e¤ort
level FOA() in the relaxed problem associated with G. As discussed in
Section 2, this solution may be approximated in the case of risk aversion,
and explicitly obtained in the case of risk neutrality. The optimal tourna-
ment (W 1 ();W

2 (); 
()) associated with G may now be characterized
in terms of FOA() as follows.
Proposition 3. Suppose that costs are quadratic and that workers have
CARA utility (which includes the case of risk-neutrality as a limit case).
Then, there is a threshold value  > 0 such that, for any  > 0, the optimal
tournament associated with G is unique and implements the e¤ort level
() = minf 

 FOA(); FOA()g. (14)
As the proposition shows, the optimal tournament will be shaped by the
envelope constraint (13) once the level of individual-specic uncertainty falls
below a certain level. In particular, the usual comparative statics result that
11
FOA() is monotone decreasing in ,16 is misleading about the comparative
statics of . Instead, as illustrated in Figure 1, the optimally implemented
e¤ort level  = () is strictly unimodal in the case of risk aversion. Sim-
ilarly,  is piecewise linear in the case of risk neutrality where FOA is a
constant.
Figure 1. The optimally implemented e¤ort level.
Denote by W FOA1 () and W
FOA
2 () the optimal prizes for the relaxed
problem associated with G. Using the second-order Taylor expansion of
utility as above, the prize spread implementing the optimal e¤ort level can
be shown to satisfy
W 1 () W 2 ()  minf


; 1g   W FOA1 () W FOA2 () , (15)
where the approximation is exact for   , and fairly precise for  close
16Cf. Lazear and Rosen (1981, p. 853) and McLaughlin (1988, fn. 5). Under the specic
assumptions of Proposition 3, the monotonicity of FOA follows from Lemma A.3 in the
Appendix.
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to zero and s small.17 Thus, also the predicted prize spread may be biased
under the rst-order approach. In particular, as  gets smaller, the optimal
spread diminishes much faster than the rst-order approach would suggest.18
5 Discussion
To clarify what happens for  < , consider a workers expected utility from
exerting an e¤ort of  in the optimal tournament associated with G, i.e.,
U() = U(W

2 ()) +G(  ())(U(W 1 ())  U(W 2 ()))  C(). (16)
Then, the following observation can be made.
Remark 1. For  < , there is a cheating level () 6= () such that
U(()) = U

(
()).
Thus, whenever the envelope constraint matters, the workers objective func-
tion U exhibits, besides its global maximum at 
(), at least one additional
global maximum at some () 6= (). To see why this is so, suppose that
there is no cheating level.Then, as intuition suggests, the rm could mar-
ginally raise the contractual e¤ort level above (), and still satisfy incentive
compatibility.19 But, by strong pseudoconcavity, the rms indirect utility
17To see this, note that the necessary rst-order condition (5) implies W1   W2 
c=U 0g(0) for the respective solutions of the unrelaxed and the relaxed problems.
18When the assumptions of Proposition 3 are relaxed, one can still show that () =
FOA() for  su¢ ciently large and that () ! 0 as  ! 0. Thus, even though the
homogeneous relationships reected in (14) and (15) tend to break down for cost functions
that do not exhibit a constant elasticity, the characterization result captures, in its essence,
a more general fact.
19Given that the workers local second-order condition holds strictly at (), this point
turns out to be an immediate consequence of Berges Theorem.
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function is strictly increasing at (), leading to a contradiction. Hence,
the workers best-response set indeed consists of at least two elements.20
For a general density g, there may be many cheating levels, possibly
innitely many. For g su¢ ciently well-behaved, however, it turns out that
there is at most one global maximizer of U other than 
(). We will say
that g is strictly bell-shaped if there is an r > 0 such that g00(z) ? 0 if jzj ? r.
The following observation can now be made.
Remark 2. Suppose that g is strictly bell-shaped. Then, for any   (s),
() =
g(0)
g(0)  g() , (17)
() =
g()
g(0)  g() , (18)
where  is the unique strictly positive solution of the equation
g(0) + g()
2
=
1

Z 
0
g(z)dz. (19)
The two remarks above are illustrated by the following two examples.
Example 1. For g standard normal,  = 2:2809. Hence, () = 0:1827  
and () = 2:4636  , for any   . For s = 0, this implies () =
minf2:4637  ;V=cg, so that  = 0:4059  V=c. For s = 0:5; 1; 2; 3; 10, the
relaxed problem was solved numerically over the grid  = 0:01; :::; 1:00. On
that sample, (s) was found to be strictly declining in s, which is intuitive.
20The necessity of a cheating levelmay be familiar from Grossman and Hart (1983,
Prop. 6) or Mookherjee (1984, Prop. 1). There, the absence of a utility-equivalent lower
level of e¤ort would allow the principal to implement the same level of e¤ort at lower cost.
Here, similarly, even though actions are continuous, the absence of a cheating levelwould
allow the rm to implement a higher level of e¤ort.
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Example 2. If "1 and "2 are uniformly distributed, then  follows a tri-
angular distribution (e.g., Bull et al., 1987; Altmann et al., 2012). The
normalized density g(z) = maxf0;minf1+ z; 1  zgg is, however, not strictly
bell-shaped, so that Remark 2 does not apply. Still, the conclusion of Propo-
sition 3 holds. For instance, for s = 0, one can check that '()  '() =
c
2
maxf0;  g, so that the optimal tournament associated with G is char-
acterized by () = minf; V=c) and W 1=2() = (V  c2 )().
Notably, the envelope constraint (13) may come into play in response to
changes in V , c, or s, i.e., even if the information structure does not change.
As discussed in the next section, an increase in the number of contestants
may have a similar e¤ect.
6 Large tournaments
This section considers an extension to tournaments with more than two con-
testants. Attention will be restricted to the case of a single winner.
Denote by F and f the distribution and density functions associated
with an individual error term " (assumed i.i.d. across players). Considering
a tournament between n workers, and provided that all opponents of some
given player j exert the same e¤ort level , worker js probability of winning
may be represented as
Gn(j; ) =
Z +1
 1
F (j + "  )n 1dF ("). (20)
15
The problem of the rm is only slightly modied:
max
W1W2
0
U(W1) + (n  1)U(W2)
n
  C() (21)
s.t.
V =
W1 + (n  1)W2
n
(22)
(U(W1)  U(W2))Gn(b; )  C(b) (23)
 (U(W1)  U(W2))Gn(b; )  C() (b  0)
The optimal tournament satises, in particular, the necessary rst-order con-
dition for a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium,
U(W1)  U(W2) = n()  C
0()
gn
, (24)
where
gn = (n  1)
Z +1
 1
F (")n 2f(")2d". (25)
An approximation for the solution of the relaxed problem, FOAn , can be
found as before. However, as pointed out by McLaughlin (1988, p. 241), it is
in general very di¢ cult to tell if the rst-order approach is valid for large n.
To side-step the rst-order approach, one denes again the upper enve-
lope,which reads in this case
'n() = maxb0 f(Gn(b; ) Gn(; ))n() + C()  C(b)g . (26)
Then, as above, one can show that if marginal costs are logconcave, then the
optimally implemented e¤ort n in the tournament between n workers and
the corresponding optimal e¤ort level FOAn in the relaxed problem satisfy
n  FOAn . Thus, also in tournaments with more than two contestants, the
16
rst-order approach, if invalid, would tend to overstate implemented e¤ort
levels.
Additional conclusions can be obtained by focusing, as Nalebu¤ and
Stiglitz (1983) do, on the incentive compatibility condition at the specic
e¤ort level b = 0. In the case of the normal distribution at least, one may
then characterize the limit behavior of n as follows.
Proposition 4. Suppose that F is normal. Then, as the number of con-
testants n increases above all nite bounds, the optimally implemented e¤ort
level n goes to zero.
The result above characterizes the limit behavior of a sequence of optimal
tournaments in a setting where it is a priori not clear if the rst-order ap-
proach is applicable. It follows from the proposition that the rst-order
approach is indeed invalid in large tournaments in the case of risk-neutrality.
Even though Proposition 4 holds also under the assumption of risk-aversion,
no conclusion is possible about the validity of the rst-order approach in
large tournaments for the case of risk-aversion. However, this fact only sup-
ports the usefulness of the envelope approach because it delivers results also
in situations where su¢ cient conditions for the rst-order approach may be
di¢ cult to nd.
7 Conclusion
It has been shown that the rst-order approach, if used exclusively, may lead
to a positively biased assessment of the e¢ ciency of rank-order tournaments.
In particular, tournaments may not be very suitable as compensation schemes
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when performance is a relatively good signal of e¤ort. Intuitively, prize spread
and performance measurement are complements, forcing rms to reduce the
former when the latter improves. In the settings studied above, the prize
structure is so unrewarding that the avoidance of cheating becomes a binding
constraint, overruling the usual trade-o¤ between risk and incentives. As
a consequence, individual contracts such as piece rates may dominate the
optimal tournament even when workers are risk-neutral.21
In a recent survey, Waldman (2013) nds as one of the testable pre-
dictions of tournament theory that the prize is increasing in the number of
contestants. The results of the present paper suggest, however, that that pre-
diction might not be robust because with many contestants, the rst-order
approach need not be valid, and the symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium
may lead to ine¢ cient levels of e¤ort. This observation might even help to
explain the negative relationship between the salary gap between CEO and
vice president and the number of VPs (OReilly et al., 1988).
Regarding further research, one issue might be the question of whether the
theoretical issues discussed in this paper may constitute a practical reason for
not using tournaments. For example, Lazear and Rosen (1981, p. 848) argue
that in the case of risk-neutrality, the tie between individual contracts and
tournaments is broken by di¤erential costs of information and measurement.
The present analysis obviously provides an alternative hypothesis. Another
interesting issue would be the extension of the present analysis to tourna-
ments with more than a single winner (Krishna and Morgan, 1998; Kalra
21With this type of observation, the present paper takes the same line as, e.g., Chaigneau
et al. (2014), who show that the su¢ cient statistics theorem fails to hold when the rst-
order approach is dropped in a standard principal-agent problem.
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and Shi, 2001; Budde, 2009; Akerlof and Holden, 2012) or to various types
of unbalanced tournaments (e.g., Meyer, 1992; Kono and Yagi, 2008; Imhof
and Kräkel, 2015). Finally, it might be worthwhile to explore whether the
comparably simple approach outlined in Section 3 could be applied to other
settings in contract theory and mechanism design.22
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. By Jensens inequality, constraint (3) implies
(U(W1) + U(W2))=2  U(V ). Hence, from the Inada conditions, there is a
 > 0 such that implementing any  >  is strictly inferior to  = 0. By
(3) and (5), this implies that there is a W > 0 such that W1;W2 2 [ W;W ]
for any optimal tournament. Thus, one may replace the feasible set by I =
f(W1;W2; ) 2 [ W;W ]2  [0; ] : (3), (4), and W1  W2g. But I 6= ?,
because (0; 0; 0) 2 I. Moreover, I is closed as an intersection of closed sets.

The following lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 2.
22The present paper has followed Green and Stokey (1983) in assuming that rms re-
strict attention to tournaments that have a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Under this assumption, tournaments ultimately become useless as an incentive device
when monitoring becomes arbitrarily precise. Indeed, in the limit, there does not exist
any pure-strategy equilibrium for W1 > W2 (e.g., Bull et al., 1987, fn. 3), forcing the rm
to set W1 = W2. However, allowing for randomization would not re-establish e¢ ciency.
Also, the characterization of mixed-strategy equilibria in tournaments with little noise
seems to require di¤erent methods (Ewerhart, 2015), and therefore lies beyond the scope
of the present analysis.
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Lemma A.1. Dene
 (; b)  @
@
f()(G(b  ) G(0)) + C()  C(b)g (27)
= 0()(G(b  ) G(0)) ()g(b  ) + C 0(), (28)
where 0() = C 00()=g(0). Then the family f (; b)gb0 is equidi¤erentiable
at any   0.
Proof. Since g is a density with bounded rst and second derivatives,
@2 (; b)
@2
= 000()(G(b  ) G(0))  300()g(b  ) (29)
+ 30()g0(b  ) ()g00(b  ) + C 000() (30)
exists and is bounded in b, for any   0. It follows that the family
f@ (; b)=@gb0 is equicontinuous at any   0. Using the Mean Value
Theorem, as in Milgrom and Segal (2002, p. 587), f (; b)gb0 is now seen
to be equidi¤erentiable at any   0. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Denote by X() the set of maximizers in problem
(11). Using Lemma A.1, it follows from Milgrom and Segal (2002, Th. 1&3)
that ' is right-hand di¤erentiable at any   0 with
'0(+)  lim
"!0+
1
"
('(+ ")  '())   (; b), (31)
for any b 2 X().23 Moreover, as a consequence of local and global optimality
conditions,
()g(b  )  C 0(b)  0, (32)
23Intuitively, the value function increases by at least as much as the value at any given
global maximum.
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and
()(G(b  ) G(0)) + C()  C(b)  0, (33)
for any b 2 X(). Suppose  > 0. Then, using inequalities (32) and (33) to
put a lower bound on (28) shows that
'0(+)   C
00()
C 0()
(C()  C(b))  C 0(b) + C 0()  (; b) (34)
for any b 2 X(). By assumption, C 00=C 0 is weakly decreasing. Therefore,
for any b  ,
C 00()
C 0()
(C()  C(b)) = C 00()
C 0()
Z 
b C
0(e)de (35)

Z 
b C
0(e)C 00(e)
C 0(e) de (36)
= C 0()  C 0(b). (37)
Hence, (; b)  0 in this case. Using completely analogous arguments, one
shows that, similarly, (; b)  0 if b > . Thus, '0(+)  0 for any  > 0.
Note also that ' is continuous on R+, as a consequence of Berges theorem. It
follows that ' is monotone increasing (Royden, 1988, Sec. 5). Hence, noting
that '(0) = 0, the feasible set of problem (12-13) is an interval [0; #], for
some #  0. But FOA is a global optimum of U . Therefore,   FOA,
proving the rst assertion. The second assertion is now immediate. 
For the following three lemmas, the assumptions of Proposition 3 are im-
posed.
Lemma A.2. U is strongly pseudoconcave in .
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Proof. Total di¤erentiation of equations (3) and (5), and subsequently
solving the resulting system of linear equations, yields
dW1
d
=
2V u02 + c=g(0)
u01 + u
0
2
, (38)
dW2
d
=
2V u01   c=g(0)
u01 + u
0
2
, (39)
where u01  U 0(W1) and u02  U 0(W2). Therefore,
@U
@
= 2V
u01u
0
2
u01 + u
0
2
+
c
2g(0)
u01   u02
u01 + u
0
2
  c. (40)
Di¤erentiating (40) with respect to , and assuming that @U=@ = 0, one
obtains
@2U
@2
=
2V
u01 + u
0
2

u001u
0
2
dW1
d
+ u01u
00
2
dW2
d

+
c=2g(0)
u01 + u
0
2

u001
dW1
d
  u002
dW2
d

  c
u01 + u
0
2


u001
dW1
d
+ u002
dW2
d

  c, (41)
where u001  U 00(W1) and u002  U 00(W2). Hence, using (38-39) and @U=@ = 0
another time, one arrives at
@2U
@2
= ( 2s)  2V
2u01u
0
2 + c
2=4g(0)2   c22
u01 + u
0
2
  c, (42)
where s =  u001=u01 =  u002=u02  0. It follows that @2U=@2 < 0 if  
1=2g(0). Otherwise, i.e., if  > 1=2g(0), then @U=@ = 0 implies
2V u01u
0
2 = c(u
0
1 + u
0
2) 
c
2g(0)
(u01   u02) (43)
= c(  1
2g(0)
)u01 + c(+
1
2g(0)
)u02 (44)
 cu02. (45)
Hence,
2V u01  c: (46)
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Moreover, combining (43) with u02  u01, one nds 2V u01u02  2cu01, so that
V u02  c: (47)
Multiplying the two inequalities (46) and (47), one arrives at 2V 2u01u
0
2  c22.
It follows that @2U=@2 < 0, which proves the claim. 
Lemma A.3. FOA > 0. Moreover, FOA is continuous and, provided s > 0,
strictly decreasing in .
Proof. It is shown rst that FOA > 0. Indeed, for  = 0, equations (3) and
(5) imply W1 = W2, so that evaluating equation (40) at  = 0 yields
@U
@

=0
= 2V
u01u
0
2
u01 + u
0
2
> 0. (48)
Hence, FOA > 0, as claimed. Di¤erentiating now (40) with respect to  and
exploiting that @U=@ = 0, one obtains
@2U
@@
=
2V
u01 + u
0
2

u001u
0
2
dW1
d
+ u01u
00
2
dW2
d

+
c=2g(0)
u01 + u
0
2

u001
dW1
d
  u002
dW2
d

  c
u01 + u
0
2


u001
dW1
d
+ u002
dW2
d

+
c
2g(0)
u01   u02
u01 + u
0
2
. (49)
But, from equation (3) and the rst-order condition U(W1)  U(W2) = cg(0) ,
it is immediate that
dW1
d
=  dW2
d
=
c
g(0)(u01 + u
0
2)
. (50)
Simplifying the right-hand side of (49) using (50), and using that s > 0, one
arrives at
@2U
@@
=   sc
2
2g(0)2(u01 + u
0
2)
  sc
22(u02   u01)
g(0)(u01 + u
0
2)
2
  c(u
0
2   u01)
2g(0)(u01 + u
0
2)
< 0. (51)
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Since U is strongly pseudoconcave with respect to , the claim follows. 
Lemma A.4. () 6= FOA() for some  > 0.
Proof. From incentive compatibility with respect to a deviation to b = 0,
0  (G( ) G(0))C
0()
g(0)
+ C()  C(0)    c
g(0)
+
c2
2
, (52)
where the second inequality follows from G  1. Hence,   2=g(0),
and therefore, () ! 0 as  ! 0. On the other hand, by Lemma A.3,
FOA() does not tend to zero as  ! 0. Thus, for  > 0 su¢ ciently small,
() 6= FOA(), which proves the lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 3. By Lemma A.4, there is a e > 0 such that (e) 6=
FOA(e). Hence, the envelope constraint must be binding in the reformulated
problem associated with Ge. Since marginal costs are logconcave, it follows
from the proof of Proposition 2 that   (e) is equivalent to
(Ge(b  ) Ge(0))C 0()
ge(0) + C()  C(b)  0 (b  0): (53)
Let  > 0. Then, with   =e, purely algebraic manipulation exploiting
the homogeneity of the cost function shows that
(Ge(b  ) Ge(0))C 0()
ge(0) + C()  C(b)
=
1
2

(G(b   ) G(0))C 0()
g(0)
+ C()  C(b) , (54)
where    and b  b. Hence,   (e) is equivalent to
(G(b   ) G(0))C 0()
g(0)
+ C()  C(b)  0 (b  0). (55)
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Invoking Lemma A.2, it follows that
() = minfe(e); FOA()g (56)
for any  > 0. By Lemma A.3, there is a unique  such that
e (e) = FOA(). (57)
Moreover,
() =
e(e) = FOA() (58)
if   , and () = FOA() if  > . 
Proof of Remark 1. Suppose the rm intends to implement an e¤ort level
e. In the resulting tournament, a workers expected utility from exerting an
e¤ort of  may be written as
eU(je) = U(e) +G(  e)(e)  C(), (59)
where (e) = ce=g(0), and U is a function that does not depend on .
Note that
@2 eU(je)
@2
=
g0(  e)ce
g(0)
  c. (60)
Since g0 is continuous with g
0
(0) = 0, this implies that there is an open
and bounded neighborhood N of () such that (60) is strictly negative
for any (; e) 2 N N . In particular, for any e 2 N , the restriction
of eU(je) to N has a unique maximum at e. Since N is bounded, Inada
conditions imply there is some max > 0 such that eU(je) < eU(eje) for any
 > max and for any e 2 N . By choosing the open set N su¢ ciently small,
the compact set M = [0; max]nN is clearly non-empty. The restriction
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of U  eU(j()) to M therefore assumes its maximum in M, say at
some (). Incentive compatibility implies U(())  U(())  0. To
provoke a contradiction, suppose that U(())   U(()) < 0. Then,eU(j())   eU(()j()) < 0 for any  2 M. By Berges Theorem,
this implies eU(je)   eU(()je) < 0 for any  2 M, provided that e is
su¢ ciently close to (). Hence, such e is incentive compatible. But, by
Lemma A.2, U(e) is strictly increasing in e in a neighborhood of (),
which is impossible. 
Proof of Remark 2. W.l.o.g., let  <  (the case  =  follows by
continuity), and choose some optimal (W 1 ();W

2 (); 
()) associated with
G. Then, from Remark 1, there is a () such that
(U(W 1 )  U(W 2 ))(G(   ) G(0)) =
c
2

()2   ()2
	
, (61)
where the argument  has been dropped to ease notation. From the In-
ada conditions,  > 0. Hence, both  and  are interior maxima of
U(j; ()), satisfying
g(0)(U(W

1 )  U(W 2 )) = c, (62)
g(   )(U(W 1 )  U(W 2 )) = c, (63)
where g(z) = g(z=)=. Adding (62) and (63) up, multiplying the result
through with (   )=2, and subsequently subtracting (61), one arrives at
g(0) + g()
2
=
G() G(0)

, (64)
where  =  . Equation (64) allows at most one strictly positive solution
 = (). To see this, dene the function
h() = G() G(0)  g(0) + g()
2
. (65)
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Then, h0(0) = 0, and h
00() =  g00()=2. Thus, since g is strictly bell-
shaped, there is indeed at most one solution. Next, note that (64) im-
plies () =   (1). Finally, from the rst-order conditions, g(0)=g() =
()=(). Simple algebra leads now to (17). 
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the specic deviation to b = 0. For any
  0, we have
'n()  (Gn(0; ) Gn(; ))C
0()
gn
+ C()  C(0) (66)
  C
0()
ngn
+ C()  C(0), (67)
since Gn(; ) = 1n . For 

n to constitute an equilibrium in the tournament
between n workers, it is necessary that 'n(n)  0. Hence,
C(n)  C(0)
C 0(n)
 1
ngn
: (68)
Because f 0(") =  "f(")=2 in the case of the normal distribution, integrating
by parts yields
ngn = n
Z +1
 1
(n  1)F (")n 2f(")2d" (69)
=  n
Z +1
 1
F (")n 1f 0(")d" (70)
=
n
2
Z +1
 1
"F (")n 1f(")d" (71)
w 1

p
2 lnn, (72)
where the asymptotic relationship for the mean extreme of n identically and
independently distributed normal variables has been taken from David and
Nagaraja (2003, Sec. 10.5). But, as in the proof of Proposition 1, Jensens
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inequality implies
U(W1) + (n  1)U(W2)
n
 U(V ) (73)
for any n. Hence, n   for any n. Since ngn ! 1 for n ! 1, it follows
from (68) that, indeed, n ! 0 for n!1. 
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